From its inception, Elon Musk’s so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) operated as a rogue entity within the US government, slashing staff and funding, gaining access to government systems, and overriding agency decisionmaking—all without oversight from officials who have little understanding of its reach and methods.
A report issued by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) on Thursday adds new insight on how this incursion happened, while raising grave concerns about the possibility of a catastrophic data breach that would affect all Americans and serious questions about who DOGE operatives answer to.
Oversight staff detail how DOGE gained control over federal agencies, focusing their probe on three of DOGE’s primary targets: the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Social Security Administration (SSA).
“A clear pattern emerged across agencies—officials who questioned DOGE were pushed out, and DOGE-affiliated personnel were installed in key positions such as Chief Information Officer,” the report finds. “The DOGE associates were then able to grant approval to other DOGE employees to work with sensitive data without restrictions.”
Throughout the report, committee investigators describe DOGE representatives as working clandestinely within the agencies they were sent to serve and in spaces kept under armed guard, seemingly not beholden to government officials.
“At one point, GSA officials said they did not have the key to open a locked room that had windows covered with black paper, trash bags, and tape,” the report says, describing HSGAC staffers’ attempts to inspect the agency’s offices. “When staff asked why the most senior officials in offices charged with building management and security could not open an office door, GSA could not provide an answer.”
According to the report, investigators were forbidden from taking photos of where DOGE worked at GSA, which they noted appeared to be the group’s “primary technical hub.” It was also clearly a living space: GSA officials told Senate staffers they’d purchased furniture to outfit seven bedrooms for “intermittent sleeping;” there was even a “makeshift bedroom” next to the administrator’s suite, which one official was surprised to find. The GSA administrator’s dining room had unmade beds and a hot plate, while an office labeled “chief of staff” had a Ping Pong table and a nearby kitchen had “a dedicated fridge stocked with Celsius energy drinks and Muscle Milk.”
The administrator’s office was filled with 10 work stations, stacks of laptops (8 to 10 per person), and "multiple cellphones.” The GSA officials could not confirm that the devices were provided by GSA or who the DOGE reps working there reported to, simply calling them “GSA employees.” DOGE associates at the SSA were also allowed to telework, even as all other staffers were called back to the office. Many DOGE members were detailed to several agencies simultaneously, in a move that several experts have noted is unprecedented.
“Senior officials at SSA, GSA, and OPM all failed to provide information about who was in charge; what conduct DOGE teams were engaged in; and what data those teams had been given access to, including the authorities and restrictions guiding their access,” the report says. “None of the agencies could answer simple questions about organizational charts and employee roles.”