GoKawiilOn the night of June 26, 2025, firefighters on Tower Ladder 14 raced to a Chicago apartment building where an arsonist had poured gasoline on both stairwells. When they arrived, the aerial ladder would not go up. The crew had to shut the rig off entirely and restart it. The delay lasted approximately one minute. Four people died that night — including a pregnant woman, her five-year-old son, and her sister, who threw her own child from a third-floor window before perishing herself.
Nobody told the surviving family about the ladder malfunction. They found out from journalists.
That malfunctioning truck is a thread. Pull it, and what unravels is one of the clearest illustrations of how private equity — the $9.4 trillion industry that quietly controls roughly 11,500 American companies and 11 million jobs — turns essential public infrastructure into profit extraction machines, often at lethal cost.
The Business Model: Brilliant for Investors, Brutal for Everyone Else
Private equity is not a mystery. The mechanics are straightforward, the incentives are transparent, and the outcomes are predictable once you understand how the machine works.
A private equity firm raises a fund — typically from pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, and wealthy individuals. It then acquires companies, usually through a leveraged buyout (LBO): a structure where 50 to 90 percent of the purchase price is financed by debt, and that debt is loaded onto the balance sheet of the acquired company, not the firm making the acquisition. The firm then charges the fund a management fee — historically 2 percent of assets annually — plus carried interest: a 20 percent cut of any profits, taxed at the long-term capital gains rate of 20 percent rather than the ordinary income rate of 37 percent. Critics have long called this a tax loophole. Congress has debated closing it for two decades and has not.
US private equity AUM reached $3.128 trillion in 2024 alone, according to S&P Global. Total private markets AUM globally sits at approximately $15 trillion.
The model works when applied to underperforming businesses that genuinely need restructuring. PE firms can bring operational discipline, growth capital, and strategic focus. That is the affirmative case, and it is real.
The problem emerges when the model is applied to essential services with inelastic demand — industries where the customer has no choice but to pay, where quality degradation is hard to measure until catastrophe strikes, and where the typical PE timeline of 3-to-7 years before exit creates incentives to strip value rather than build it.
The Senate Joint Economic Committee’s July 2024 report described this as a “buy, strip and flip” business model: PE firms load acquired companies with debt, cut costs aggressively, then resell at a profit — often at the direct expense of workers, communities, and the services those companies provide. Public companies acquired by PE are approximately ten times more likely to go bankrupt than a comparable control group subject to the same market forces, the report found.