GoKawiilThis article is adapted by the author with permission from Tech Policy Press. Read the original article.
South Africa is not just another developing country struggling to govern artificial intelligence (AI); it is the exception with leverage, and the window to act on it is closing. It holds approximately 88% of global platinum-group metal reserves, critical inputs to parts of the semiconductor and data center supply chains that make AI infrastructure possible. It hosts the largest data center market on the continent. Its existing hyperscaler relationships give it procurement leverage that most African states will never have. And a major geopolitical contest over AI infrastructure is being fought on its soil right now, between Chinese and American technology companies competing for control of the systems that will underpin an entire continent’s public sector.
In physics, leverage requires three things: a fulcrum, a lever arm and the ability to apply force. The Bushveld Complex, the world’s largest platinum-group metal deposit, is the fulcrum: a mineral endowment that gives South Africa a position in the semiconductor supply chain that no other African state holds. The since-withdrawn draft policy is the lever arm. The unresolved “OPTION” provisions in the policy are where force would be applied. Without a policy that specifies what South Africa wants in return for market access, the lever arm sits unused, and the weight of two of the world’s largest technology ecosystems settles exactly where those ecosystems want it to settle.
This makes South Africa a global test case. Not because its proposed means of governance is exemplary, but because it is the one developing country with enough structural leverage to negotiate genuinely different terms, and the one that is choosing, through inaction, not to. The recent announcement of a new panel to update the draft policy is an important opportunity. But the deeper failure is not that an AI policy contained bad references. It is that no verification process caught them before the document entered the public domain. That is a systems problem, not merely a political one. It points to a missing layer in how governments are adopting AI.
The contest already underway
Last year, Huawei, pitched an emerging product bundle to tech executives across the continent. Huawei was now bundling access to the DeepSeek’s large language model with its own cloud and storage infrastructure. The price differential was stark: in some cases by more than 90%.
At the same time, Microsoft announced plans to spend ZAR 5.4 billion ($300 million) by the end of 2027 on cloud and AI infrastructure in South Africa, building on a prior ZAR 20.4 billion investment. Google, AWS and Oracle already have cloud regions in the country. According to one analysis, the country’s data center market was valued at $2.16 billion in 2024, the largest in Africa.
These are not commercially neutral investments. Huawei’s infrastructure reach has been explicitly linked to Chinese strategic objectives, including a documented track record of providing governments with surveillance infrastructure through its Safe Cities network. US hyperscaler investment comes with its own dependency structure: closed models, pricing set unilaterally and terms of access that no African government has meaningfully shaped. South Africa is being asked to choose between these dependency models without a policy that specifies what it wants in return.
The leverage it has
There is a particular irony in South Africa’s position. The country whose mines supply platinum-group metals essential to semiconductor manufacturing, and through them to AI compute, has drafted a policy that treats it as a consumer of AI systems rather than a stakeholder in their governance. South Africa digs up the minerals that make AI possible. It has no say over the AI built from them.
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