GoKawiilStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy updates 'Holes' entry, revised May 2025
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's long-running entry on the metaphysics of holes, first published in 1996, has received a substantive revision dated May 12, 2025. The entry examines whether holes qualify as real entities or are merely linguistic fictions, drawing on evidence from ordinary language, causal reasoning, and cognitive science studies on how infants and adults perceive and track holes.
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The entry's persistence and periodic revision over nearly three decades reflects ongoing philosophical interest in questions of ontology that extend beyond holes to broader debates about what counts as a 'real' object. Citing developmental psychology research suggests philosophers increasingly draw on empirical cognitive science to inform traditionally abstract metaphysical questions.
- The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on holes was first published in 1996 and substantively revised in May 2025.
- The entry explores whether holes are genuine entities or merely figures of speech, citing ordinary causal language about holes.
- It references empirical studies showing infants and adults perceive, count, and track holes similarly to physical objects.
Source: plato.stanford.edu — Casati, 2026-10-02
Published there as: “Holes (1996-2025)”
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