GoKawiilResearcher bypasses RP2350 Secure Boot using custom laser fault injection rig
A security researcher built a custom laser fault injection platform to attack the RP2350 microcontroller, targeting Raspberry Pi's DEFCON 2024 Hacking Challenge. Using a single laser-induced fault, the researcher reportedly bypassed the chip's Secure Boot protections and extracted secret data stored in its OTP memory, then submitted the findings to Raspberry Pi.
GoKawiil's interpretation of the reporting above, not reported fact.
The result suggests that even newer microcontrollers with dedicated security hardware, such as glitch detectors and locked debug interfaces, can remain vulnerable to physical fault-injection attacks given sufficient attacker resources. Publishing manufacturing details for a DIY laser rig could lower the barrier for others to replicate such attacks, which may push chipmakers to harden future designs against optical fault injection specifically.
- A researcher built a custom laser fault injection platform to attack Raspberry Pi's RP2350 microcontroller.
- A single laser fault reportedly bypassed the chip's Secure Boot feature in the official DEFCON 2024 Hacking Challenge.
- The researcher is sharing manufacturing files for the platform, potentially making the technique reproducible by others.
Raspberry Pi Pico 2 Board — If you want to follow along with RP2350 security research like this, the Pico 2 board is the actual hardware being targeted in the challenge. It's an affordable way to experiment with the chip's Secure Boot features and fault injection concepts yourself.
See Raspberry Pi Pico 2 Board on Amazon → Affiliate link — we may earn a commission on purchases, at no extra cost to you. Product picked by AI based on this article; it is not a tested recommendation.Source: courk.cc, 2026-10-15
Published there as: “Laser Fault Injection on a Budget: RP2350 Edition”
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