GoKawiilTL;DR: Noma Labs discovered a critical prompt injection vulnerability within GitHub’s new Agentic Workflows, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to silently pull data from private repositories by posting a crafted GitHub Issue in a public repository belonging to the same organization as the private repositories. Noma Labs named the vulnerability GitLost.
Introduction
GitHub recently launched GitHub Agentic Workflows, pairing GitHub Actions (GitHub’s automation system for running tasks in response to repository events) with an AI agent backed by Claude or GitHub Copilot. GitHub Agentic Workflows allow teams to write their GitHub workflows in plain Markdown, and the GitHub agent reads issues, calls tools, and responds on its own.
As a vulnerability researcher with a security development background, one of the first questions that came to mind after this launch was fundamental and straightforward: What will happen when the GitHub agent reads something it should not trust?
The answer is a textbook indirect prompt-injection attack, the kind of attack that quietly sends private data to anyone on the internet. Prompt injection is a class of attack in which an adversary hides malicious instructions inside the content read by an AI agent. That content causes the agent to follow those hidden instructions instead of the ones its operator intended.
What are GitHub Agentic Workflows?
GitHub Agentic Workflows let teams automate their interactions with code repositories using natural language. Workflows live in Markdown (.md) files, are compiled into YAML (a common configuration file format), Actions files with the .yml extension, and run with the help of an AI agent with configurable permissions. The GitHub agent can read issues, call tools, and access other repositories within an organization.
GitLost Vulnerability Overview
The root cause of the GitLost vulnerability is, by now, a familiar one in agentic AI systems: prompt injection. In most agentic prompt injection attacks, the agent treats the wrong content as a trusted source of instructions and allows itself to be misdirected or misused. This happens when the system fails to maintain a strict trust boundary between system-level directives and untrusted user data. In this specific case, any malicious actor can create a GitHub Issue and, in the issue body, hide commands in plain English that GitHub’s agent will follow.
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